The Case for a Powerful Executive in Post-2003 Iraq

The Case for a Powerful Executive in Post-2003 Iraq

Introduction

When President Barack Obama channeled Martin Luther King Jr. and declared that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice,” he was not articulating a truth but expressing a hope, a deeply American, almost theological belief in the inevitability of progress. However, any realistic and sober assessment of history would indicate that this arc does not now exist and never has. History does not bend on its own. Justice, freedom, and human flourishing do not arise spontaneously nor inevitably. In post-invasion Iraq, the United States had a singular opportunity to bring such a future into being. But it chose instead to assume that democratic procedures alone would guide the country toward justice. This proved to be a fatal error.

As Dr. Tarek Masoud put it, “the Arab world today finds itself torn between two visions of progress: One seeks to replace the regimes that dominate the region; the other seeks to replace the people who inhabit it”. The latter is a delusion in the short run. People cannot be replaced, cultures cannot be unmade by decree, and the presumption that a social good exists which should be imposed from above is a slippery slope towards tyranny. Therefore, the only practical path to reform in Iraq in the wake of Saddam’s ouster, would have been to replace the regime, not through the abstract, unconstrained democracy which the Iraqis tried and failed to implement, but through the establishment of a strong, coherent executive power capable of maintaining security, legitimacy, and institutional continuity. Only through these prerequisite conditions can the people of the Arab world be given the opportunity, in the long run, to flourish as autonomous and free citizens in a democratic society.

This essay argues that the United States should have imposed a system centered on a strong executive in the form of a limited constitutional monarchy modeled on an American constitution-style strong presidential republic. What matters most is not the symbolism of monarchy versus republic, but the presence of executive strength embedded in institutional constraint. These systems provide frameworks for national stability and gradual civic development, rather than the disorder and fragmentation produced by a French Revolution-style democracy. Drawing on the insights of Marsin Alshamary, Mieczyslaw Boduszyński, Ryszard Kapuściński, Rodgers and Hammerstein, and Curtis Yarvin, the only living political theorist who will still be read in two centuries, this essay traces the political failure of post-invasion Iraq to a flawed model of governance.

Dancing Bears

Ryszard Kapuściński’s Dancing Bears tells of a Soviet-trained bear, released into the wild, who continues to perform circus tricks in the forest. The bear has been liberated, but only in his physical form. His body is free, but his habits are not. This metaphor captures the disorientation of societies emerging from authoritarianism. Eastern Europeans, raised in an environment defined by dictatorship, did not immediately embrace or understand the workings of democratic pluralism. Their instincts remained conditioned by control.

Iraqis, too, were dancing bears. After decades of Saddam’s rule, underpinned by brutal coercion and institutional omnipresence, the Iraqi people were thrust into an open political arena with little civic scaffolding. As in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, democratic governance arrived before democratic substance. Elections were held, parliaments convened, and constitutions written. But these gestures occurred in a political culture that had not yet internalized democratic norms.

Kapuściński’s image reminds us that freedom is not just the absence of constraint, it requires re-education, habituation, and time. Iraqis mimicked democratic procedures without believing in them, similar to how the bears danced not because they enjoyed doing so, but because they had always been made to. A limited constitutional monarchy could have functioned as a stable framework in which new civic habits might be cultivated, an intermediate space between tyranny and democracy.

Syrian intellectual George Tarabishi described a similar dilemma in his essay “The Problematics of Democracy in the Arab World” He referred to two ballot boxes: the physical box into which votes are cast, and the psychological “box in the head” of the voter, the set of internalized values and expectations that condition democratic behavior. True democracy, he argued, cannot emerge unless both boxes are addressed. The external trappings of elections and institutions are meaningless unless accompanied by deep internal change in political consciousness and civic responsibility.

Curtis Yarvin further echoes this concept in his article “How to Occupy and Govern a Foreign Country,” where he critiques American postwar interventions for trying to impose democratic forms without reshaping the underlying machinery of governance and public psychology. Yarvin suggests that effective occupation must transform both institutions and ideology, otherwise elections become mere performance and not vehicles of genuine sovereignty. Iraq’s post-2003 experience confirms this. The people received the first box, the structures of democracy, without the long, slow work required to transform the second. That transformation cannot be imposed. It must be cultivated, and it requires not only time but a security and prosperity that allows new habits to take root.

Failures in Unrestrained Democracy

The French Revolution offers a vivid example of how unmoored democratic idealism can spiral into chaos without executive discipline. In 1792, the National Convention, the most democratic body to ever exist in France at the time, abolished the monarchy and declared a republic. The Convention, elected through universal male suffrage, wielded legislative and executive power with few constraints. But without a stable institutional framework or a clear executive center, the Convention quickly devolved into factionalism.

Under pressure from external war and internal unrest, the revolutionary government created the Committee of Public Safety, intended as a temporary measure to enforce order and save the Republic. It became, instead, the engine of the Reign of Terror. Revolutionary tribunals, mass arrests, and guillotine executions followed as democratic legitimacy gave way to paranoia and purges. The very body that claimed to represent the general will became a tool of repression and fear.

This collapse mirrors Iraq’s own post-2003 experiment. Democratic institutions in both cases were empowered before they were secured. Following Saddam Hussein’s fall, Iraq moved quickly to draft a new constitution. A transitional government was established under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and Iraqis elected a Transitional National Assembly in January 2005. This body, composed through a sectarian quota system, was tasked with drafting a permanent constitution. This constitution was completed in just a few months. Though it established a democratic framework, the process was rushed and lacked broad-based consensus, especially among Sunni Arabs, many of whom boycotted the referendum. The document reflected both the CPA’s vision and the political calculations of dominant Shia and Kurdish parties, embedding sectarian power-sharing into Iraq’s institutional design. Without a stable executive authority to mediate conflict and enforce the rule of law, Iraq’s parliament became a theater for sectarian conflict and political dysfunction. The lesson of 1789 is not that democracy fails, but that democracy without a strong, yet restrained executive is a recipe for instability and tyranny.

Militias and the Collapse of Authority

“There is no greater tyrant than a weak king,” said The King of Siam in Rodgers and Hammerstein’s The King and I . A weak central authority, the hallmark of post-Saddam Iraq, was a recipe for tyranny. Where the state cannot assert a monopoly on force, militias fill the void. Alshamary notes that “the proliferation of armed paramilitaries testifies to the fact that the country has not yet achieved a monopoly on violence”. Boduszyński’s account reinforces this: “Militias filled the void created by the CPA’s disbanding of the Iraqi army and police,” evolving into “the de facto security sector” while also engaging in “criminal activity”.

Central among these militias is the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or al-Hashd al-Shaabi. Initially formed in 2014 in response to a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to combat ISIS, the PMF has since evolved into a powerful and entrenched parallel security force. While nominally under the command of the Iraqi state, the PMF operates with significant autonomy, often loyal more to their individual factions or to foreign powers like Iran than to the central government. PMF units have been implicated in abuses against civilians, political intimidation, and the suppression of protest movements. Their pervasive influence over politics, security, and even economic activities in southern Iraq further erodes the authority of the state.

In 2016, Sadrist protesters stormed the Green Zone demanding reforms, and government forces failed to resist them. That power vacuum showed the state’s inability to impose order even on its capital.

Oil and the Obstacles to Democracy

Hazem Beblawi argues that rentier economies sever the link between taxation and representation. In Saddam’s Iraq, oil revenues funded a vast patronage system. Boduszyński calls it “a bloated, inefficient body presiding over an unreformed state-driven, oil-dependent economy”. Alshamary similarly observes that Iraq’s political system, backed by oil rents, has become a spoils system rather than a democracy. Michael Ross, in his influential article “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” argues that oil wealth enables authoritarian regimes to avoid both taxation and accountability, reducing pressures for democratization while increasing state capacity to suppress dissent. This dynamic has played out in Iraq, where the state became an allocator of oil wealth rather than a responsive democratic institution. The result was clientelism, not citizenship, and dependency instead of participation.

Other scholars, such as Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, challenge Ross and Beblawi’s conclusions. In their research, they contend that the relationship between oil and authoritarianism is not as deterministic as often portrayed. Their empirical analysis suggests that oil wealth does not necessarily undermine democratic institutions and that the political outcomes of oil dependence vary significantly across cases. This suggests that the failure of democracy in Iraq may have more to do with institutional design and security deficits than with oil alone.

Constitutional Monarchies Considered

Jordan’s monarchy is both constrained and centralized. It has maintained stability and institutional continuity. The president wields concentrated power over foreign affairs and defense. Yet checks and balances, federalism, and an independent judiciary moderate that power. American federalism also buffers sectarianism by allowing regional self-governance and offers a pragmatic way to manage Iraq’s entrenched regionalism and ethnic divisions. Iraq has long struggled with regional tensions, between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, and among Sunni, Shia, and minority populations. A federalist model like that of the United States could have provided mechanisms for decentralized governance, allowing different regions to exercise autonomy while remaining under a cohesive national framework. It would have created space for both local identity and national unity.

Moreover, American-style federalism can ease the tension between secularism and religious pluralism by ensuring that no single sect dominates the national stage. Iraq’s post-Baathist political chaos stems in part from the collapse of social hierarchies that, while often oppressive, provided predictability and structure. Paul Bremer’s de-Baathification purged thousands based on affiliation, not conduct. “This policy emptied the bureaucracy of managers… and replaced them with politically connected exiles,” writes Boduszyński, many of whom “had no idea how to run agencies”. It dismantled Iraq’s administrative memory and opened the door for sectarian opportunism. Baathism disrupted traditional tribal and religious hierarchies, attempting to replace them with a state-centered ideology. The consequence was not democratization but disorder, an erosion of authority without a viable replacement. Both a strong executive presidency and a constitutional monarchy with federalist principles would have allowed Iraq to restore institutional hierarchy without reverting to tyranny.

Yarvin calls the U.S. system “a monarchy with bad optics”, executive strength masquerading as participatory rule. He suggests that power should be explicit and accountable rather than symbolic and scattered. Iraq could have benefited from a system in which a democratically elected president wielded real authority, constrained by courts, a bicameral legislature, and a federal structure designed to absorb sectarian tensions.

Counterarguments

Danielle Allen contends that political representation is essential to dignity. Without it, citizenship becomes hollow. Yet, it would be hard to argue that people living under a decades long state of perpetual civil war live with very much dignity. A state must first ensure the lowest tiers of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs before addressing “self-actualization”. A system with strong executive constraints can uphold order while gradually enabling meaningful participation. She might further argue that representation is the only legitimate basis for governance and that strong executives lead inevitably to authoritarianism. But the historical record shows that executive power, when institutionally constrained, can coexist with civil liberties.

Dr. Tarek Masoud might argue that monarchies risk entrenching inequality and marginalizing dissent. Fair enough. However, a limited constitutional monarchy does not inherently silence criticism and can serve as a transitional framework. Masoud’s concern about long-run stagnation presumes institutions that are already capable of surviving in the long term. But in fragile, post-conflict environments, survival itself is the first milestone. Short-term stability must precede long-term reform. If successive short-run governments deliver order and accountability, they can lay the foundation for sustainable democratic development. As Hannah Arendt wrote, “Each new generation is a new invasion of civilization by barbarians.” The message need not be one of pessimism, but can, instead be seen as a message for hope: future generations, shaped under stable institutions, may mature into democratic citizens even if their predecessors could not.

Alshamary expresses cautious optimism, noting that while Iraq faces significant challenges, the country has made progress and may continue on a democratic path. She acknowledges citizen skepticism but urges outside observers to recognize that Iraq’s democratic experiment may still bear fruit. Zhou Enlai’s reputed quip that it is “too early to tell” the consequences of the French Revolution reminds us that historical judgment requires patience and perhaps Iraq’s story, like that of France, is still unfolding. The bungled imposition of democracy on Iraq may still prove to be a success in the grand-scope of history.

Lessons for a Future North Korean Transition

A future collapse of the North Korean government, whether due to internal dysfunction, a power vacuum following the death of its leader, or a rebellion driven by economic and humanitarian desperation, could force the United States to reconsider its reluctance toward nation-building. Despite the ‘never-again’ attitude that followed the Iraq War, such a crisis may compel America to lead a new international coalition tasked with post-authoritarian reconstruction. Such an undertaking would mirror, in complexity and scale, the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. Yet the errors of Iraq must serve as critical lessons for designing a more effective transitional strategy.

Like Iraq prior to Saddam’s fall, North Korea is a highly centralized authoritarian state with virtually no functioning civil society. Its population has been subject to ideological indoctrination and economic isolation for generations. If the regime collapses, the resulting power vacuum will leave an institutional void. The Iraq experience showed that dissolving core state institutions, such as the army and civil service, without a viable replacement leads to chaos, insurgency, and a loss of credibility for any transitional authority. In North Korea, preserving the basic administrative machinery while gradually reforming it will be essential. De-Kimization must not repeat the overreach of de-Baathification.

Furthermore, just as Iraq’s democratic experiment failed in part due to an absence of executive coherence and monopolized force, any North Korean transitional government must be anchored by a strong executive. A useful historical precedent is General Douglas MacArthur’s administration of post-war Japan, where centralized and decisive leadership under U.S. guidance helped stabilize the country and oversee a successful transition to democratic governance. Whether modeled on an American presidential system or a technocratic caretaker backed by a multinational coalition, the regime must centralize authority to prevent fragmentation among factions, regional commanders, or remnants of the Workers’ Party.

However, key differences remain. North Korea’s ethnic and linguistic homogeneity contrasts sharply with Iraq’s sectarian divisions. South Korea’s existence as a culturally aligned, economically powerful neighbor with a constitutional democratic model introduces an external anchor and possible blueprint for reunification or transition, an asset Iraq lacked. Still, overreliance on external models without tailoring them to local realities, as in Iraq, could be counterproductive. In short, whether America likes it or not, it may again, someday soon, be made responsible for state-building; this time in North Korea. The reconstruction will require institutional humility, long-term engagement, and firm but flexible executive governance. Iraq’s post-2003 trajectory demonstrates that democratization without order is not reform but folly. Only by learning from that failure can the next effort at post-authoritarian state-building hope to succeed.

Conclusion

In 2003, the United States had the power to reorder the Iraqi state. Instead of designing a system suited to Iraq’s unique social and historical conditions, it imposed a universalist vision of democracy divorced from reality. The result has been two decades of violence, instability, and despair.

A strong executive, whether through a limited constitutional monarchy or a presidential republic, could have anchored Iraq in legitimacy and allowed democratic norms to grow gradually and organically. Executive coherence, institutional continuity, and cultural adaptation are essential preconditions for democracy to thrive in post-authoritarian societies. Justice is not an arc. It is the result of a wise purposeful construction and historical luck. Only by learning from Iraq’s mistakes can future state-building projects, in North Korea or elsewhere, hope to succeed. Historical humility is essential and order is a necessary prerequisite to liberty.

Bibliography

Allen, Danielle. Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education. University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Alshamary, Marsin. “Iraq’s Struggle for Democracy.” Journal of Democracy, 2023.

Beblawi, Hazem. “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” chapter 8 in Giacomo Luciani (ed.) Public Finance in the Arab Countries, International Development Research Centre, 1986 (pp. 198-212)

Boduszyński, Mieczyslaw P. “Iraq’s Year of Rage.” Journal of Democracy, 2023.

Haber, Stephen, and Menaldo, Victor. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” The American Political Science Review 105, no. 1 (2011): pp. 1-26.

Kapuściński, Ryszard. Dancing Bears. Vintage, 2017.

Masoud, Tarek. “The Arab Spring at 10: Kings or People?” Journal of Democracy, 2021.

Rodgers, Richard, and Oscar Hammerstein II. The King and I. New York: Williamson Music, 1951.

Ross, Michael L. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-61.

Tarabishi, George. “The Problematics of Democracy in the Arab World,” 1998, translated by William Tamplin.

Yarvin, Curtis. “How to Occupy and Govern a Foreign Country.” Unqualified Reservations, 2008.